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We consider the task of secure multi-party distributed quantum computation on a quantum net-
work. We propose a protocol based on quantum error correction which reduces the number of
necessary qubits. That is, each of the n nodes in our protocol requires an operational workspace
of n2 + 4n qubits, as opposed to previously shown Ω
(
(n3 + n2s2) logn
)
qubits, where s is a secu-
rity parameter. Additionally, we reduce the communication complexity by a factor of O(n3 log(n))
qubits per node, as compared to existing protocols. To achieve universal computation, we develop
a distributed procedure for verifying magic states, which allows us to apply distributed gate tele-
portation and which may be of independent interest. We showcase our protocol on a small example
for a 7-node network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation is a task which allows
n nodes of a network to jointly compute a function on
their inputs [1]. The inputs are private, meaning that
they are only known to the nodes who supplied them.
What is more, the only information that can be inferred
about the private inputs is whatever can be inferred from
the outputs of the computation and the computation it-
self. Multi-party computation allows for distributed eval-
uation of any function, and hence it is a powerful cryp-
tographic primitive with many practical (e.g. clearing a
commodity derivative market) and theoretical (e.g. zero
knowledge proofs) applications [2].
In the domain of quantum computation the problem
of multi-party quantum computation (MPQC) on quan-
tum data was first introduced by [3]. It can be defined
as follows: each node i = 1, . . . , n gets one, possibly un-
known, input quantum state ρi. The nodes jointly per-
form an n-input arbitrary quantum circuit R on their
inputs ρ1, . . . , ρn. The output of the circuit is divided
into n parts and each node i gets i-th part of the output
state, see Figure 1. In MPQC there can be nodes who
do not follow the protocol (cheaters). We then require
that an MPQC protocol satisfies the following informal
requirements:
• (Correctness) If there are no cheaters, then the pro-
tocol implements the intended circuit R on the in-
puts of the nodes.
• (Soundness) Cheaters cannot affect the outcome of
the computation of the other nodes, beyond their
ability to choose their own inputs.
• (Privacy) Cheaters do not learn anything about pri-
vate inputs and outputs of the other nodes.
Throughout this paper we will consider that an input ρi
of each node is a single-qubit state.
The approach taken by the original work of [3] is based
on a subroutine called verifiable quantum secret sharing
∗ v.lipinska@tudelft.nl
and is a generalization of a classical multi-party com-
putation [4]. The security achieved by the protocol is
information theoretical, meaning that the cheaters are
not constrained by computational assumptions. How-
ever, the number of cheaters has to be strictly smaller
than n6 . This bound was later lifted to
n
2 by [5], who
used authentication schemes and approximate error cor-
rection. However this solution requires significantly more
qubits to be realized. At the same time, there exist paral-
lel approaches tolerating a cheating majority and whose
security relies on computational assumptions, for exam-
ple [6] for the case of n = 2 or its recent generalization
to n > 2 [7]. Note that a protocol tolerating more than
n
2 cheaters is not possible without additional computa-
tional assumptions, since that would imply the existence
of unconditionally secure bit commitment [8, 9].
In this work we are interested in the former approach
to MPQC, namely the one based on verifiable quantum
secret sharing of [3]. Our objective is to perform MPQC
on a quantum network with n nodes using as few qubits
as possible. The approach we take is based on [3] and
extensively relies on techniques from fault-tolerant quan-
tum error correction. It can be intuitively understood
as follows. Nodes use a chosen quantum error correcting
code and create a global logical state Ψ¯ by encoding each
!1
Figure 1. Each of the nodes 1, . . . , n provides a single-qubit in-
put ρ1, . . . , ρn. The goal of the multi-party quantum comput-
ing (MPQC) protocol is to implement circuitR such that each
node gets an output ω1, . . . , ωn without gaining any knowl-
edge of the other inputs or outputs beyond their ability to
choose their own inputs. Note that the inputs (and outputs)
can be entangled.
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2Our protocol Crepeau et al. [3]
size of the input in qubits per node 1 Ω(logn)
size of an individual share during the computation
1 Ω(logn)in qubits per node
# qubits in workspace per node n2 + 4n Ω
(
(n3 + n2s2) logn
)
# qubits sent per node O((n+ #ancillas + #T )ns2) O((n2 + #ancillas)n3s2 log(n))
Table I. Summary of qubit savings presented in this paper, s denotes the security parameter of the protocol, #ancillas denotes
the number of ancillas in circuit R, and #T denotes the number of T gates. The size of the workspace in our protocol does
not depend on the security parameter, because of the sequential execution of the verification phase, see Section III B 1. Note
that here we do not list the work of [7], since their protocol does not use techniques based on error correction and achieves
computational security guarantees.
of the single-qubit input states. Each node holds a part
of this logical state, we call such a part a share. They
verify the encoding of each state using verifiable secret
sharing protocol and perform local operations to evalu-
ate a logical version of the circuit R, and then locally
reconstruct their outputs.
To be able to apply any circuit R this way, we need
two properties. First, R needs to be composed of gates
which form a universal set, i.e. any circuit can be decom-
posed into gates from that set. Second, if the nodes apply
only local operations Λ from the universal set, it should
yield a meaningful logical operation Λ¯ for the global state
Ψ¯. This property is called transversality. However, for
any error correcting code, it is impossible to perform
universal quantum computation using only transversal
gates [10]. For this reason, it is common to extend a
transversal set of gates (for example Clifford gates) with
a non-transversal gate (for example T gate or the Tof-
foli gate). Note that there exist methods to realize single
non-transversal gates in a distributed way, for example
by using ancilla states [11] or locally modifying the error
correcting code [12].
In particular, [3] considers quantum polynomial codes
and a universal set of gates with the Toffoli gate [12].
This solution is very expensive in qubits. Firstly, the
polynomial codes require local shares whose dimension
scales with the number of nodes, and therefore require
Ω(log n) qubits per share. Moreover, the nodes need to
perform a distributed encoding of the shares in order to
apply the Toffoli gate. This means that each input state
must be encoded three times using the polynomial code.
Performing the three-level encoding serves one more pur-
pose, namely, it localizes all of the errors in the encod-
ing to the positions of the cheaters. As a result, the
cheaters cannot force the protocol to abort, since any
error they introduce will always be corrected by the un-
derlying polynomial code. All in all, each node needs
an operational workspace of Ω
(
(n3 + n2s2) log n
)
qubits,
where s is the security parameter of the protocol, see Ta-
ble I. We remark that in schemes based on exact error
correcting codes, the number of cheaters t is intrinsically
constrained by the distance d of the underlying code as
t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋, which in principle can reach n4 [13, 14]. How-
ever, the technique for applying the Toffoli gate in [3]
puts a constraint on the number of cheaters to n6 .
Since near-term quantum networks will be able to sup-
port only a small number of qubits, it would be preferable
to implement an MPQC protocol with as few qubits as
possible. So far, reducing quantum resources has received
a lot of attention in the domain of non-distributed quan-
tum computation and simulation, see for example [15–
19]. Recently, in [20] we considered a problem of reduc-
ing quantum resources for a distributed protocol, namely
verifiable secret sharing of a quantum state. Here we ad-
dress a similar issue of whether distributed multi-party
quantum computation can be performed on a quantum
network with less quantum resources. We answer this
question positively by proposing a scheme for universal
distributed computation which uses fewer qubits as com-
pared to the existing approach of [3] outlined above.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
summarize our contributions, where in IIA we discuss the
implications of our protocol on resource reduction and in
II B we give an explicit example of the protocol on a 7-
node network. In Section III we zoom in on the technical
aspects of our work. There we present the protocol in
detail and provide formal security statements. We leave
out technical proofs for Appendix A.
II. RESULTS
We propose a protocol for secure multi-party quan-
tum computation where each node holds single-qubit
shares. Our approach is based on quantum error cor-
recting codes, similar to the idea of [3, 5, 21]. Since our
interest lies in reducing the quantum resources necessary
to realize the protocol, we abandon the original idea of
three-level encoding at the cost of allowing the protocol
to abort if the initial encoding of the shares is incorrect.
Thanks to this, we are able to execute the protocol with
less qubits in the workspace per node and lower commu-
nication complexity, see Table I. Moreover, we develop
a procedure for a distributed verification of any logical
state which is stabilized by a Clifford gate. This allows
us to perform distributed gate teleportation and imple-
ment a universal set of gates without creating three levels
of encoding. What is more, we follow the approach out-
lined in [20] which allows for a sequential execution of
the verification of the inputs. This solution reduces the
3operational workspace to n2 + 4n qubits per node. We
show that our protocol is secure in the presence of active
non-adaptive cheaters (see Adversary model), where the
number of cheaters is constrained by the distance d of the
underlying error correcting code, i.e. t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋. Finally,
we showcase our protocol on a small example for 7 nodes
using Steane’s 7-qubit code [22].
The key to our results is using error correcting codes
which encode a single qubit into n single qubits. Fur-
thermore, we allow the MPQC protocol to abort if there
are too many errors detected during the execution of the
protocol. It is, however, possible to execute our protocol
without the abort event, see Section IV. This solution
requires many more rounds of communication and we
do not consider this approach explicitly. We develop a
distributed verification procedure for magic states which
allows us to implement gate teleportation in a distributed
way. Lastly, we verify the input of each node using an-
cillas distributed in a sequential way. We elaborate on
these techniques in the next section, Section IIA.
Outline 1 (Multi-party quantum computation).
Input: single-qubit state ρi from each node, CSS
code Cˆ with transversal Cliffords, circuit R.
1. Sharing and verification
Each node i = 1, . . . , n encodes her input ρi
using code Cˆ into an n-qubit logical state, and
sends one qubit (i.e. one single-qubit share)
of the logical state to every other node, while
keeping one for herself. The nodes jointly ver-
ify the encoding done by node i using verifi-
able quantum secret sharing protocol (see Pro-
tocol 1).
2. Computation
• For every Clifford gate in circuit R:
The nodes apply transversal Clifford
gates locally to qubits specified by the
circuit R.
• For every T gate in circuit R applied to
qubit i:
Node i prepares the magic state |m〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+eipi4 |1〉). The nodes verify it using
Verification of Clifford-Stabilized States
protocol, see Protocol 3. If the verifica-
tion is successful, the nodes perform Dis-
tributed Gate Teleportation, see Protocol
2.
Every |0〉 ancilla state required for circuit R,
which is prepared by node i, is jointly verified
by the nodes using verifiable quantum secret
sharing, Protocol 1.
If the verification of any step fails the nodes
substitute their shares for |0〉 and abort the
protocol at the end of the computation.
3. Reconstruction
Each node i collects all shares of her part of
the output. She corrects errors using code Cˆ
and reconstructs her output.
Network model. We consider a quantum network
with n nodes. Each node can locally process O(n2)
qubits, and can perfectly process and store classical in-
formation. Each pair of nodes is connected via private
and authenticated classical [23] and quantum [24] chan-
nels. Additionally, we assume that the nodes have access
to an authenticated classical broadcast channel [25] and
a public source of randomness. Note that a source of
randomness can be created, for example, by running a
classical multi-party computation protocol [26].
Adversary model. We say that t out of n nodes
are active cheaters during the protocol. This means that
they can act maliciously throughout the entire execution
of the multi-party computation and perform arbitrary
joint quantum operations on their shares, possibly with
quantum side information. Therefore, the security of our
protocol does not rely on computational assumptions.
We assume that the active cheaters are non-adaptive,
meaning that they are determined prior to the beginning
of the protocol and stay fixed throughout its execution.
On the other hand, the nodes which follow the protocol
exactly are honest. A protocol tolerates the presence of t
active cheaters if they cannot influence the output of the
protocol beyond choosing their own inputs.
A. Techniques
Thanks to using single-qubit error correcting codes,
distributed verification of magic states, the possibility
to abort the protocol and sequential verification of the
inputs, our MPQC protocol lowers the number of qubits
that each node needs to control and send. Here we discuss
in detail all the reductions made by our protocol. Then,
we give an explicit example of a protocol based on the
7-qubit Steane’s code.
• Single-qubit CSS codes. We consider a class
of Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correcting
codes [22, 27], which encode a single logical qubit
into n physical qubits, and for which applying Clif-
ford gates is transversal, see Section IIIA for de-
tails. In particular, this means that each input
state and each encoded ancilla is encoded and dis-
tributed using single-qubit shares. For comparison,
the protocol of [3] uses a class of polynomial codes,
called Reed-Solomon codes [12], where the size of
individual share grows with the number of nodes n
in the network as Ω(log n) qubits.
4• MPQC with abort. We introduce an “abort”
event in the MPQC protocol. That is, the protocol
aborts if there are more than t errors introduced
by the cheaters, accumulated over all inputs. This
condition is necessary, since applying a transver-
sal gate between different logical inputs can still
propagate errors between them. As a result, we
are able to perform the MPQC protocol on the
two-level encoding created by the verifiable quan-
tum secret sharing (VQSS) subroutine, see Section
III B. This allows us to achieve a lower communica-
tion complexity – in our protocol each node sends
O((n+ #ancillas+ #T )ns2) qubits, as opposed to
O((n2 + #ancillas)n3s2 log(n)) qubits in [3], where
s denotes the security parameter of the protocol,
#ancillas denotes the number of ancillas in circuit
R, and #T denotes the number of T gates. Note
that in our protocol we can avoid the abort event by
creating the third level encoding, following the idea
of [3]. This approach confines the errors of all in-
puts only to the positions of t cheaters, see Section
IV for discussion. However, this solution signifi-
cantly increases quantum communication complex-
ity. Since our objective is to reduce the number of
qubits, we do not consider this approach here.
• Verification of Clifford-stabilized states. We
develop a distributed method for verifying states
stabilized by the Clifford gates, which in particular
can be applied to verify magic states. This solution
allows us to perform distributed gate teleportation
and apply the T gate in a distributed way. Recall
that for our MPQC protocol we choose CSS codes
with transversal Clifford gates. This, together with
distributed gate teleportation and transversal mea-
surements, provides a way to apply a universal set
of gates in a distributed way. Thanks to using
magic state ancillas, we can perform the compu-
tation on a two-level encoding created during the
verification phase (see Protocol 4). This means that
each node controls n2 single-qubit shares of all in-
puts. In contrast, in the approach of [3] the nodes
need to apply a non-linear Toffoli gate to achieve
universality of computation. This, in turn, required
a workspace of Ω
(
(n3+n2s2) log n
)
qubits per node.
• Sequential verification. We use the verifiable
quantum secret sharing (VQSS) protocol of [3] to
verify that the encoding was carried out correctly
and that at the end of the computation there will be
a state to reconstruct. The verification procedure
requires ancillary states. However, following the
idea developed in [20], we perform the verification
in a sequential way. That is, to verify each input
we use the ancillas one by one instead of all at once
as in [3]. In particular, the nodes use at most 2n
single-qubit ancillas at a time to verify the input
states (or ancillas inR) and at most 4n single-qubit
ancillas to apply the T gate.
All in all, this amounts to an operational workspace
of at most n2 + 4n single qubit shares for our protocol.
Out of those, n2 shares correspond to the input states
on which the distributed computation is performed. For
comparison, the protocol of [3] requires simultaneous con-
trol over Ω
(
(n3 + n2s2) log n
)
qubits per node, where s
is the security parameter of the protocol. Moreover, due
to introducing the possibility of aborting the protocol,
our MPQC scheme lowers the communication complex-
ity. That is, our protocol reduces the number of qubits
that each nodes has to send by a factor of O(n3 log(n))
compared to the protocol of [3].
Finally, when the number of cheaters t is restricted by
the distance d of the CSS code, i.e. when t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋,
we prove that our protocol satisfies the usual security
requirements (soundness, completeness and privacy, see
above). Our statements follow from the fact that any
error correcting code has the ability to correct at most⌊
d−1
2
⌋
arbitrary errors and therefore, any errors intro-
duced by the cheaters can be corrected by the honest
nodes. What is more, the inputs and outputs of honest
nodes will be also private, since if they recover the out-
puts exactly, then the cheaters get no information about
inputs or outputs [28]. Our statements hold with proba-
bility exponentially close to 1 in the security parameter s.
B. Example for 7 nodes
Let us consider a network of n = 7 nodes and assume
that the nodes want to perform a CNOT between inputs
ρ1 and ρ2 of nodes “1” and “2” of the network. For the
execution of this protocol we will need a workspace of 28
qubits per node. For the sake of the example, we will
also assume that the inputs are pure single-qubit states,
ρ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and ρ2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, and that the protocol
does not abort. The 7-qubit Steane’s code [22] is the
smallest example of a qubit CSS code with transversal
Cliffords. This code has distance d = 3 meaning that it
can correct
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
= 1 arbitrary error. This also means
that in an MPQC protocol built on the 7-qubit code, we
can tolerate t = 1 cheater.
Sharing and verification. Node “1” encodes her single-
qubit pure input |ψ1〉 into 7 physical qubits using the
Steane’s code encoding map E . She sends one qubit to
each of the remaining 6 nodes, while keeping one qubit to
herself. Each node again encodes the received qubit using
the Steane’s code and shares 6 qubits of that encoding
with other nodes. At this point the input state |ψ1〉 has
been encoded twice, i.e.
Ψ¯1 = E⊗7 ◦ E(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|), (1)
Ψ¯2 = E⊗7 ◦ E(|ψ2〉〈ψ2|). (2)
Each node holds 7 qubits in total.
The nodes run the verification procedure according to
[20], verifying that the encoding of each node i was done
correctly. The encoding of each input state can be veri-
fied one at a time. In one round of verification of a single
5input, each node uses at most 14 local ancilla qubits.
The ancillas shares are encoded twice with the 7 qubit
code and distributed in the same way as the input states.
The nodes randomly perform the CNOT gate between Ψ¯1
and an ancilla, to identify errors possibly introduced by
cheating nodes. These ancillas are then measured and the
outcome of the measurement allows the nodes to jointly
conclude whether verification of the encoding was cor-
rect, i.e. whether the distributed input states have at
most t = 1 error on the same position. If so, then the
errors are correctable by the 7 qubit code, and the nodes
hold a valid logical state of the code. This procedure is
repeated s2 + 2s times in total, where s is the security
parameter.
The same sharing and verification procedure is carried
out for node “2” and her single-qubit pure input |ψ2〉: it is
first shared and then verified. As before, the verification
requires at most 14 local ancilla qubits at a time. After
the second verification each node holds 14 verified data
qubits corresponding to the logical inputs Ψ¯1⊗ Ψ¯2. Note
that the input states are never measured.
Computation. Each node applies the CNOT gate lo-
cally to shares coming from node “1” and “2”. The CNOT
gate is a Clifford gate. Therefore, since the inputs are
verified to be logical states of the 7 qubit code, applying
the CNOT locally is well-defined and yields a logical op-
eration between logical inputs Ψ¯1⊗ Ψ¯2. Let us define the
output of the computation ω¯,
ω¯ = ¯CNOT
(
Ψ¯1 ⊗ Ψ¯2
)
. (3)
Reconstruction. Nodes “1” and “2” get all of the shares
corresponding to her own outputs, i.e.
ω¯1 = tr2(ω¯), ω¯2 = tr1(ω¯). (4)
They separately run local error correcting circuit of the
7 qubit code on ω¯1 and ω¯2, respectively. They identify
errors, see Reconstruction of Protocol 4 for details. This
is necessary, since the cheater might have introduced er-
rors during or after the computation, and right before the
reconstruction. Each of the nodes “1” and “2” corrects er-
rors and reconstructs her output ω1 and ω2, respectively.
The outputs are single qubit states, and are such that
ω1 = tr2(CNOT (|ψ1〉〈ψ1| ⊗ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|)), (5)
ω2 = tr1(CNOT (|ψ1〉〈ψ1| ⊗ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|)). (6)
III. METHODS
In this section we discuss our MPQC protocol in detail.
We lay down the framework by first discussing proper-
ties of CSS codes which will be useful for the distributed
computation in Section IIIA. Then we introduce a few
important subroutines, namely Verifiable Secret Sharing
(Section III B 1), Distributed Gate Teleportation (Sec-
tion III B 2) and Verification of Clifford-Stabilized States
(Section III B 3). Finally, in Section III C we discuss our
Multi-party Quantum Computation protocol and state
its security in Section IIID.
A. CSS codes
In our considerations we will focus on a class of error
correcting codes called Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
codes [22, 27]. A CSS code C is defined through two bi-
nary classical linear codes, V andW , satisfying V ∗ ⊆W ,
where V ∗ is the dual code of V . Then, C := V ∩ FW is
a set of states of n qubits which yield a codeword in V
when measured in the standard basis, and a codeword in
W when measured in the Fourier basis. A code encod-
ing one logical qubit into n physical qubits is commonly
denoted with double square brackets [[n, 1, d]]. Here d is
the distance of the code, which relates to the maximum
number of arbitrary errors t which the code can correct
as t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋.
In distributed computation each node can only apply
local operations. Therefore, we want that logical opera-
tions Λ¯ are implemented by applying local operations Λ
on the individual qubits held by the nodes and encoded
with C, i.e. Λ¯ = Λ⊗n. This property is called transver-
sality. For our construction of the MPQC protocol we
choose specific CSS codes Cˆ with transversal operations,
which satisfy:
1. Cˆ uses the same classical code to correct X and Z
errors, i.e. V = W .
2. The weight of the stabilizer generators of Cˆ is a
multiple of 4, and the logical Pauli operators X
and Z have weight 1 mod 4, or 3 mod 4.
Property 1 guarantees that the Hadamard gate H can be
applied transversally, while property 2 guarantees that
the phase gate P =
(
1 0
0 i
)
can be applied transversally.
Additionally, note that the CNOT gate is transversal for
any CSS code. Since H,P and CNOT generate the Clif-
ford set, one can apply any Clifford gate on the code
Cˆ transversally [29]. Finally, any CSS code has a prop-
erty that measurements can be performed qubit-wise, but
the measurement outcome of every qubit must be com-
municated classically to obtain the result of the logical
measurement.
B. Subroutines
Here we list and describe the subroutines we will later
use as building blocks in our MPQC protocol. We
start with reviewing an existing construction of verifi-
able quantum secret sharing used for verifying inputs
in MPQC. Next, we discuss two of our contributions –
distributed gate teleportation and verification of states
stabilized by Clifford gates. These last two subroutines
will be essential for implementing universal circuits in
MPQC.
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first level encoding
Figure 2. Two-level encoding of the input qubit state ρ1 of node “1”. The double-encoded distributed state is denoted by Ψ¯1.
Each dot represents a single-qubit share.
1. Verifiable quantum secret sharing
One of the first ingredients of our MPQC protocol
is verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS) first intro-
duced in [3], see Protocol 1. Here we use a modified ver-
sion of the scheme, which we introduced in [20] to reduce
the qubit workspace required for each node. A VQSS
scheme is a scheme which shares a quantum state among
n nodes in a verifiable way using quantum shares. The
scheme we use is based on a CSS code C with distance
d, and tolerates at most t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ non-adaptive active
cheaters. We remark that the scheme works for any CSS
code C.
Let us describe the task in detail. In VQSS the dealer
D encodes her input state ρ using the code C. The en-
coding produces an n-qubit entangled state. D shares
this state among the nodes by sending one qubit to each
node. Each node then encodes the received one-qubit
share again with the same error correcting code into n
qubits, and sends one qubit to each of the n nodes. This
way each node holds n single-qubit shares. We denote a
double-encoded logical global state of the nodes with a
double bar, Ψ¯. Throughout the rest of this paper we will
use index i = 1, . . . , n to denote the encoding performed
by node i, and ` = 1, . . . , n to denote the share held
by node `. The share held by node ` and coming from
encoding performed by node i will be denoted as Ψ¯i` .
The nodes run a verification procedure to verify that
Ψ¯ is a valid codeword of the code C. The verification is
a generalization of Steane’s error correction method to
the distributed setting [30]. More specifically, the nodes
publicly check that there are at most t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ errors at
the first level of encoding, i.e. the encoding done by the
dealer. To do so, they use ancilla qubits encoded twice
with the same code C. These ancillas are measured dur-
ing the verification. Since C is a CSS code, the measure-
ment outcomes yield a codeword from a classical code V
(resp. W ) when measured in the standard (resp. Fourier)
basis. Using an error correcting procedure for the clas-
sical linear codes allows the nodes to identify shares of
the first-level encoding which carry errors. The positions
of these shares are collected in a public set B of appar-
ent cheaters (indeed, there is no way to tell apart the
errors introduced by the dealer and errors introduced by
the cheaters on the first-level encoding). If there are at
most t first-level errors (i.e. |B| ≤ t), the dealer passes
the verification. Moreover, since the protocol assumes
the existence of at most t cheaters, there can be at most
t errors in each second-level encoding. Therefore, if the
dealer passes the verification, at the end of the protocol
there will always be a state to reconstruct, since errors
at both first and second level encoding can be corrected
by the code C. Following the idea introduced in [20],
this verification procedure can be performed by encoding
and measuring one ancilla qubit at a time. There are
s2 + 2s iterations of the verification procedure, where s
is the security parameter. Additionally, similarly as in
[20], we use CSS codes which encode a single qubit into
n single qubits. The sequential VQSS protocol requires
a 3n-qubit workspace per node to verify one single-qubit
input state, see [20] for details. Each node needs to send
O(n2s2) qubits.
Verification of logical 0 (VQSS(0)). In the follow-
ing sections we will make use of a handy property of the
VQSS protocol of [3]. Namely, the protocol can verify
that the state shared by the nodes is exactly the logical
|0¯〉 of code C, see [3, 20, 21]. The verification phase is
almost the same as in the VQSS protocol of [3], except
now the nodes check whether the classical measurement
outcomes interpolate to 0 after decoding them twice with
a classical decoder, see [3, 21] for details. We will refer
to this verification procedure as VQSS(0).
7Protocol 1 (Verifiable Quantum Secret Sharing (VQSS) [3, 20] - outline).
Input: Single-qubit state ρ of dealer D to share, CSS error correcting code C.
1. Sharing
The dealer D encodes her input ρ into a logical state using code C and sends each qubit of the logical state
to every other node, while keeping one for herself. Each node encodes the share received from D again
using C and shares among the nodes keeping one qubit for herself. Therefore, the nodes create a two-level
encoding of ρ. At this point each node holds n single-qubit shares coming from every other node.
2. Verification
Nodes verify whether D is honest, i.e. that the shares held by the nodes are consistent with a codeword of
C and at the end of the protocol a state will be reconstructed. The nodes construct a public set B which
records positions of nodes with inconsistent shares on the first level of encoding.
Each node uses at most additional 2n ancilla qubits for one iteration of the verification procedure. There
are s2 + 2s iterations of verification, where s is the security parameter. If |B| ≤ t the dealer passes the
verification phase.
2. Distributed gate teleportation
To perform universal computation, we need a universal
set of gates. However, Clifford gates by themselves are
not a universal set. An example of a set that is univer-
sal, is the set generated by the Clifford gates extended
with the T =
√
P gate [31], denoted Cliff+T 1. On the
other hand, for any error correcting code, it is impos-
sible to perform universal quantum computation using
only transversal gates [10]. In particular, for the class of
CSS codes under consideration, Cˆ, the Clifford gates can
be applied transversally (see Sec. IIIA), but the T gate
cannot.
To remedy this problem in the domain of quantum
(non-distributed) computing, one can use a technique
called gate teleportation [11]. In particular, for the T
gate, the idea is to use a specially created ancilla state,
measure, and apply a correction depending on the mea-
surement outcome, see Figure 3. Importantly, this cor-
rection is done with XP † and since XP † is a Clifford
gate, it can be applied transversally. The cost of this
procedure is to create the special ancilla state, which is
commonly referred to as a magic state. In the case of the
T gate it is |m〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eipi/4|1〉).
We generalize this procedure to a distributed setting,
see Protocol 2. Our protocol takes two states as an input:
logical Ψ¯ and logical |m¯〉, both encoded twice (two-level
encoding) with code Cˆ. We assume at this point that
both states are verified with respect to the same dealer
D. The verification of Ψ¯ can be performed with VQSS.
However, verifying that |m¯〉 is exactly the magic state is
non-trivial and we introduce it in the next section.
To apply a logical T gate to Ψ¯ the nodes first perform
a logical transversal CNOT operation on their shares,
taking shares of |m¯〉 as a control and shares of Ψ¯ as a
target. Then each node i = 1, . . . , n measures the target
qubit in the standard basis and announces the measure-
ment outcome. Nodes publicly check whether the mea-
surement collapsed the target state onto a classical string
corresponding to a logical |0¯〉 or a logical |1¯〉. To do so,
they check whether the resulting string of measurement
outcomes vi interpolates to 0 or to 1 using the classical
decoder twice. At the same time the nodes update the
set of errors B. If the interpolated value is 0 then no cor-
rection is necessary. If the interpolated value is 1 then
the nodes apply the correction XP † transversally.
|mi
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Figure 3. Gate teleportation of the T gate. The circuit applies
the T gate to an arbitrary single-qubit state ρ. Each state may
be logical and each operation may be applied transversally.
1 One can efficiently approximate any gate G within distance 
using polylog(1/) gates from set Cliff+T [32].
8Protocol 2 (Distributed Gate Teleportation (GTele)).
Input: Ψ¯, |m¯〉 distributed by D to the nodes and verified by the nodes using VQSS (Protocol 1), set of apparent
cheaters B from verification of Ψ¯ and |m¯〉.
Output: Logical T gate applied to the input logical state, T¯ (Ψ¯).
1. Each node `, for a share coming from node i:
(a) applies CNOT with |m¯〉i` as control qubit and Ψ¯i` as target qubit,
(b) measures the target qubit in the Z basis and broadcasts the result using the secure broadcast channel,
see Network model.
2. Broadcasted values yield words vi. Nodes publicly check on which positions the errors occurred using the
classical decoder and update set B with the positions of errors. They decode the classical value a:
• If a = 0, the nodes do not apply any correction.
• If a = 1, the nodes apply XP † to their shares.
3. Verification of Clifford-stabilized states
One last ingredient we need to perform distributed
computation is to verify that the logical magic state |m¯〉
is indeed the logical magic state. This is necessary since
we want to be sure that when we apply the T gate in
a distributed way, the result will be the T gate on the
shares of honest nodes.
Here we present a protocol to verify the magic state
in a distributed way. In fact, our protocol works for any
qubit state |g〉 stabilized by a single-qubit Clifford gateG.
Our idea is inspired by so called stabilizer measurement
in quantum error correction, see Figure 4. Consider a
single-qubit gate XP † with a +1 eigenstate |m〉. Then
it holds that the state |+〉|m〉 is stabilized by controlled
XP † gate, C-XP †, where |+〉 is used as a control and
|m〉 is used as a target. That is,
C-XP †(|+〉|m〉) = |+〉|m〉. (7)
This gives us an insight into how the verification of |m〉
should work: if the target state was the magic state then
after performing C-XP † we will always measure the con-
trol in |+〉 (or equivalently, first apply H and measure 0).
Additionally, if the target was not in the magic state and
we measure the control in |+〉, we will project the tar-
get onto |m〉. For this to work, one needs to make sure
that the control qubit was in |+〉 before applying the
controlled gate.
We adapt this procedure to run on the logical level in
a distributed way as follows. Using VQSS(0), the nodes
first verify a logical |0¯〉 encoded and shared by D. They
also share |m¯〉 and verify that it is a valid codeword of Cˆ
using the VQSS, Protocol 1. This step is necessary since
we want the transversal operations which the nodes will
perform in next steps to be well defined. Each of the
nodes now applies the Hadamard gate to her share of |0¯〉
to turn it into a logical |+¯〉, and after that performs C-
XP † between her shares of |+¯〉 and |m¯〉. Then the nodes
apply the Hadamard gate to the control qubits one more
time and measure in the standard basis. They announce
their measurement results and use the classical decoder
to get the value a, just like in VQSS(0) and GTele. Note
that the protocol works as long as the gate C-XP † can
be applied transversally with respect to the code used to
encode |0¯〉 and |m¯〉.
Protocol 3 requires an operational workspace of 4n
qubits per node: first the verification of |m¯〉 requires a
3n-qubit workspace per node. After this verification step,
each node needs to store n qubits of |m¯〉 and uses an ex-
tra 3n-qubit workspace to verify |0¯〉. This amounts to a
4n-qubit workspace per node. The communication com-
plexity is the same as in the sequential VQSS protocol,
that is O(n2s2) qubits per node, where s is the security
parameter.
H
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Figure 4. Verification of the magic state using stabilizer mea-
surement. The circuit verifies that the target input is the
magic state using the fact that the state |+〉|m〉 is stabilized
by the controlled C-XP † gate.
9Protocol 3 (Verification of Clifford-Stabilized States (VMagic)).
Input: |0〉 and |g〉 prepared by D, single-qubit Clifford gate G stabilizing |g〉, error correcting code Cˆ, set of
apparent cheaters B. Output: verified logical states |0¯〉 and |g¯〉
1. The nodes run VQSS(0) with |0〉 as an input and VQSS with |g〉 as an input with dealer D. They update
the set B with apparent cheaters B0 revealed in verifying |0〉 and apparent cheaters Bg revealed in verifying
|g〉.
2. Each node `, for all shares coming from node i:
(a) applies H to |0¯〉i` ,
(b) applies C-G with |0¯〉i` as the control qubit and |g¯〉i` as the target qubit,
(c) applies H to control qubit,
(d) measures the control qubit in the Z basis and broadcasts the result using the secure broadcast channel,
see Network model.
3. Broadcasted values yield words vi. Nodes publicly check on which positions the errors occurred using the
classical decoder and update set B with the positions of errors. They decode the classical value a:
• If a = 0, continue.
• If a = 1, set B = [n] (this will cause the MPQC protocol to abort after the computation phase).
C. Multi-party quantum computation
We are now ready to perform a distributed compu-
tation using the ingredients from the previous sections.
Recall, the goal of the protocol is to perform a circuit
R in a distributed way on n single-qubit private inputs
ρ1, . . . , ρn, each coming from one node 1, . . . , n. Note
that the inputs can possibly be entangled. In universal
MPQC we compute an arbitrary circuit R. We choose
Clifford gates supplemented with a T gate to be our uni-
versal set of gates.
Sharing and verification. During this phase the nodes
jointly verify whether dealer Di is honest, i.e. whether
there are less than t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ errors in the first-level
encoding performed by Di. They publicly record the po-
sitions on which the errors occurred in the set of appar-
ent cheaters Bi corresponding to dealer Di. After all of
the dealers are verified, they publicly construct a global
set of apparent cheaters B, see step 2 of Protocol 4. If
|B| ≤ t the protocol continues. Note that |B| ≤ t implies
that each of the honest nodes holds shares with at most
t errors on the same positions of the first level of encod-
ing. Otherwise, when |B| > t, the honest nodes know
they will abort the protocol after the computation and
replace their shares with |0〉. This step is necessary to
complete the security proof.
In this phase each node requires a workspace of n2 +2n
qubits to verify all of the inputs in a sequential way, and
sends (n+1)ns2 qubits, where s is the security parameter.
The size of the workspace for our MPQC protocol does
not depend on s since the verification phase of VQSS is
performed in a sequential way.
Computation. In the computation phase, the goal is
to compute the circuit R on the twice-encoded (see Fig-
ure 2) and verified inputs. Note that the set of B of
apparent cheaters created during the verification is pub-
lic and cumulative throughout the protocol. That means
that it accumulates errors from executions of VMagic,
VQSS(0), GTele in the computation phase. If at any
point |B| > t during these protocols, the honest nodes
proceed in the same way as in the verification phase –
they replace their shares with |0〉. At the end of the com-
putation phase the nodes look at the set B. If |B| > t
the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the nodes proceed to the
reconstruction phase.
The inputs require a workspace of n2 qubits per node.
For applying the T gate, each node needs a workspace
of additional 4n qubits, see Protocol 3. Additionally, the
verification of every ancilla in R requires a workspace of
3n qubits per node. This means that each node requires
a workspace of at most n2 + 4n qubits in total. In this
phase, each node sends O((#ancillas + #T )ns2) qubits.
At this point the nodes hold a global state ω¯. Let
ω¯k = tr[n]ri(ω¯) be the outcome of each node i.
Reconstruction. After the computation phase the
cheating nodes can still introduce errors to the shares
they hold before sending them back to corresponding
dealers. Therefore, each of the dealers, after receiving
her original shares back, runs an error correcting cir-
cuit for the code Cˆ and identifies further errors. If there
is no more than t errors, she reconstructs her output
state ωi. In this phase, the nodes just exchange the ex-
isting qubits, therefore the operational workspace does
not increase from n2 + 4n. Each node sends n2 qubits.
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Protocol 4 (Multi-party quantum computation (MPQC)).
Input: private input ρi for every node i, circuit R, error correcting code Cˆ.
Sharing and Verification
1. Each node i = 1, . . . , n runs sequential verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS, Protocol 1) with single-
qubit input ρi and code Cˆ, acting as dealer Di. This way nodes create logical Ψ¯i encoded twice with Cˆ, see
Figure 2.
2. The nodes publicly create sets Bi,` containing all second-level errors from all n executions of sequential
VQSS (see [3, 20] for details). If for each node `, if |Bi,`| > t then they add node ` to a set of apparent
cheaters Bi for dealer Di. After all n executions of VQSS, they create a global set of apparent cheaters
B =
⋃
iBi. If |B| > t the nodes know they will abort after the computation. They replace all the shares
they hold with |0〉.
Computation
3. For every Clifford gate C of the circuit R the nodes apply C transversally to their local qubits. For every
T gate in R applied to the input of Di:
(a) Di creates |0〉 and |m〉. The nodes run Verification of Clifford-Stabilized States (VMagic, Protocol 3).
The nodes update the set B with apparent cheaters from execution of VMagic. If |B| > t the nodes
replace all the shares they hold with |0〉.
(b) The nodes apply Distributed Gate Teleportation (GTele, Protocol 2) to their shares of Ψ¯i and verified
|m¯〉. The nodes update the set B with apparent cheaters from execution of GTele. If |B| > t the
nodes replace all the shares they hold with |0〉 and do not apply a correction in GTele (treating the
measurement outcome as 0).
4. For every |0〉 ancilla necessary to perform the circuit R, a node i /∈ B chosen at random using the public
source of randomness, runs VQSS(0) acting as a dealer. They update B with the set of apparent cheaters
from the execution of VQSS(0). The nodes use the verified |0¯〉 to perform R. If |B| > t the nodes replace
all the shares they hold with |0〉.
5. If |B| > t the protocol aborts. Otherwise continue.
Let the logical global outcome of the computation be ω¯, with ω¯i = tr[n]ri(ω¯) corresponding to the outcome of
each node i.
Reconstruction
6. Each node sends all of the shares of ω¯i to Di.
7. Each Di:
(a) For each share coming from node j /∈ B, Di runs an error correcting circuit for the code Cˆ. She creates
a set of errors B˜i,j such that it contains Bi,j , i.e. Bi,j ⊆ B˜i,j . If |B˜i,i| ≤ t then errors are correctable,
Di corrects them and decodes the i-th share obtaining ω¯i. Otherwise, Di adds j to the global set B.
(b) For all j /∈ B, Di randomly chooses n−2t shares of ω¯i and applies an erasure-recovery circuit to them.
She obtains ωi.
Altogether, each node requires an operational
workspace of n2+4n qubits, and sendsO((n+#ancillas+
#T )ns2
)
qubits throughout the execution of the MPQC
protocol, Protocol 4.
D. Security statements
In this section we prove the security of our MPQC pro-
tocol. To do so, we first state the security framework and
definition following the work of [33–36]. We employ the
simulator-based security definition, see Definition 1 be-
low. It implies that the three properties – correctness,
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soundness and privacy defined at the beginning of this
manuscript – are automatically satisfied. Our security
definition uses two models of the protocol – “real” and
“ideal”. The real model corresponds to the execution of
the actual MPQC protocol. In the ideal model the nodes
interact with an oracle that perfectly realizes the MPQC
task and is incorruptible. The general idea is that the
protocol is secure if one cannot distinguish a real execu-
tion of MPQC from the ideal one.
In the ideal model the honest nodes can only interact
with the oracle. What is more, they do so in a so called
“dummy” way, i.e. they simply forward their input to the
oracle, and output whatever they receive from the oracle.
The cheating nodes can collude and perform any joint
operation on their inputs before sending it to the oracle.
Similarly, they can perform any joint operation on what-
ever they receive from the oracle before they output their
state. Recall that we do not make any assumption on the
computational power of the cheaters. For the purpose of
the proof we will say that the cheaters can be corrupted
by an adversary A which can corrupt at most t nodes,
but otherwise is arbitrarily powerful. Moreover, by Areal
we will denote the adversary in the “real” protocol and
by Aideal the adversary in the “ideal” protocol.
Definition 1 (-security). We say that a MPQC proto-
col Π is -secure if for any input state ρ, and any real
adversary Areal, there exists an ideal adversary Aideal,
such that the output state ωreal := Πreal(ρ) of the real
protocol is -close to the output state ωideal := Πideal(ρ)
of the ideal protocol, that is
1
2 ‖ ωreal − ωideal ‖1≤ . (8)
To prove the security of the MPQC protocol, Protocol
4 we first restate the soundness of the VQSS protocol
[3, 20, 21].
Lemma 1 (Soundness of VQSS). In the verifiable quan-
tum secret sharing protocol, Protocol 1, either the honest
parties hold a consistently encoded secret or the dealer is
caught with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(s).
Theorem 1. The Multi-party Quantum Computation
protocol, Protocol 4, is κ2−Ω(s)-secure, where κ = n+#T
gates +# ancillas in R.
Idea of the proof. Our proof is inspired by the approach
taken in [3, 21], on which we expand and explicitly show
that the outputs of the real and ideal protocol are -
close, see Appendix A. We construct an ideal protocol us-
ing a common simulation technique, where Aideal locally
simulates the MPQC protocol, Protocol 4, with honest
nodes interacting with the cheaters. This means that for
any real adversary Areal we construct an ideal adversary
Aideal by saying that it internally simulates the execu-
tion of real protocol with the real adversary Areal. Then
we formally write the execution of the real protocol. We
show that the outputs of both protocols are equal in the
case when the encoding in the sharing phase of Protocol
4 is done correctly. We also prove that the  error in
the security comes from the fact that the verification of
inputs and any ancillas needed for MPQC can fail with
probability defined by Lemma 1.
We remark that our security definition follows the
paradigm of sequential composability, formalized by the
real-vs-ideal security definition, Definition 1. The ex-
tendibility of our security definition to the more general
framework of universal composability [35, 36] is left as an
open problem.
IV. DISCUSSION
In our protocol we allow an abort when there are too
many errors introduced by the cheaters, see Protocol 4.
However, this condition can be removed following the ap-
proach outlined in [3, 21] (there called Top-Level Shar-
ing), at the cost of more rounds of quantum communica-
tion. Given our objective is to save resources, we did not
pursue this path in this manuscript. However, we can
introduce a step before computation, in which the nodes
perform a distributed encoding (creating the third level
of encoding) of the verified inputs. It works as follows.
The nodes run the VQSS verification procedure for every
input state ρi, but do not create a global set of cheaters.
Instead, they create a set Bi recording first-level errors
on input state ρi. To perform the distributed encoding
of input ρi the nodes use ancilla states prepared and en-
coded by the corresponding dealer Di. The nodes also
verify the ancillas using VQSS and add the errors that
occurred on the first level of encoding of ancillas to Bi. If
|Bi| ≤ t, the nodes perform the distributed encoding with
the verified ancillas. The encoding can be done transver-
sally, since for any stabilizer error correcting code the
encoding procedure is a Clifford operation [37].
If a dealer is caught cheating, |Bi| > t, the protocol
does not abort. Instead, a node which has not been
caught cheating yet prepares an encoding of |0〉 and the
nodes proceed to verify it in the same way as before.
Note that there will be at most t failed tries in preparing
a valid encoding of |0〉 since there are at most t cheaters.
Otherwise, upon a successful verification of the encoded
|0〉, the nodes proceed to the distributed encoding. This
step replaces the invalid input from the cheater with a
valid encoding of |0〉. Same procedure, “try until you
succeed”, can be adapted to verify magic states and |0〉
ancillas needed to perform the circuit R. The nodes sim-
ply try until the verification of an ancilla has at most t
errors.
Performing the distributed encoding of the inputs cre-
ates a three-level encoding before the computation phase.
The shares initially dealt by dealer Di are then sent back
to Di, who reconstructs them and corrects the errors us-
ing the reconstruction step from VQSS (as in reconstruc-
tion of MPQC, Protocol 4). As a result, each node holds
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a single qubit corresponding to a correctly encoded input
state ρi, with at most t errors confined to the cheaters’
positions. The protocol proceeds with the distributed
computation, but now the circuit is performed on a sin-
gle level of encoding. Since the errors are only on the
shares held by the cheaters, the errors will not propagate
to the honest shares during the computation. Therefore,
after the computation it will be possible to reconstruct
outputs for the honest nodes.
Finally, we remark that the distributed encoding can
be performed in a sequential way, similar to the execu-
tion of VQSS we present in Protocol 1. In fact, this does
not increase the qubit workspace per node, each node will
not exceed the workspace of n2 + 4n. However, this ap-
proach has significantly higher quantum communication
complexity. Specifically, in this version of the protocol,
each node needs to send O(n5s2) qubits.
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Appendix A: Security proof.
Here we provide the security proof of our protocol based on the simulator definition, see Definition 1. We first
construct the ideal protocol step by step and model each operation performed in this protocol by general maps, and
finally express the output of this protocol ωideal in terms of these maps. Then, we analyze the real protocol and
similarly express its output ωreal in terms of the maps modeling the real protocol. Finally, we compare the two
outputs, ωideal and ωreal, and show they are exponentially close in the security parameter s.
To prove security of the MPQC protocol, Theorem theorem 1, we first state the following useful lemma. Intuitively,
it says that sharing and verifying the input, performing the distributed circuit and decoding is equivalent to applying
the circuit to the inputs directly. Note that we consider the decoding to be “hypothetical” – after the computation
phase in MPQC the nodes send all of the shares coming from input of node i to node i, and node i reconstructs it.
Lemma 2. Let B be a set of apparent cheaters at the end of the computation phase, such that |B| ≤ t, and A be a
set of cheaters. Let D denote the decoding procedure for code Cˆ and Dˆ denote the erasure recovery circuit for code Cˆ.
If the state ρ¯ encoded twice with the code Cˆ is decodable, i.e.
ρ =
⊗
i∈[n]
DˆB∪A ◦ ⊗
`∈B∪A
D`
 (ρ¯), (A1)
then applying a logical gate G¯ (G ∈ Cliff + T ) on ρ¯ is also decodable, i.e.
G(ρ) =
⊗
i∈[n]
DˆB∪A ◦ ⊗
`∈B∪A
D`
(G¯(ρ¯)) , (A2)
where G¯ is gate G applied transversally on the CSS code Cˆ if G ∈ Cliff, or it is the implementation of the T gate
described in Protocol 2 if G = T . The same property holds when replacing G by the projective measurement in the Z
basis denoted P , and where P¯ corresponds to measuring each qubit of the double-encoded state in the Z basis followed
by broadcasting the outcome classically.
Proof. The lemma follows from the fact that to realize a logical gate G¯ it is sufficient to apply G honestly on shares
in B ∪A. Indeed, applying a Clifford gate transversally on shares in B ∪A realizes a logical Clifford gate [29]. For
a CSS code Cˆ measuring each qubit in the Z basis and broadcasting the measurement result realizes the logical
transversal measurement. Additionally, we implement the T gate by composing an ancilla state, Z measurement and
a Clifford operation. Therefore, the transversal properties of Cliffords and Z measurement can be transferred to this
implementation of the T gate.
Property 1. Let R be a circuit implementing a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map. Lemma 2 holds
when replacing G by any circuit R,
R(ρ) =
⊗
i∈[n]
Dˆ
B∪H¯ ◦
⊗
`∈B∪H¯
D`
(R¯(ρ¯)) . (A3)
This follows from the fact that any circuit R can be represented as R = P ◦U , where U can be decomposed into gates
from the set Cliff+T and P is a measurement.
As a reminder, let us restate the security of our MPQC protocol.
Theorem 1. The Multi-party Quantum Computation protocol, Protocol 4, is κ2−Ω(s)-secure, where κ = n+#T gates
+# ancillas in R.
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Proof of theorem 1. This proof is inspired by the approach taken in [3, 21]. In the following we construct a proof
aiming to show that the outputs of the real and ideal protocol are -close. We first construct an ideal protocol using
a simulator approach and formally state every step of the simulation. Then we formally write the execution of the
real protocol.
Box 1. Registers used in the security proof.
Ideal protocol:
HS – registers of “dummy” inputs of the honest nodes in the simulation
AS – registers of the cheaters’ inputs
H0 – registers of the simulated honest nodes
A0 – registers of the simulated cheaters.
Real protocol:
HR – registers of honest nodes
AR – registers of cheaters.
A0
Figure 5. Schematic of our simulator-based security proof of the MPQC protocol, Protocol 4.
Ideal protocol. Aideal will locally simulate the MPQC protocol, Protocol 4, with honest nodes interacting with the
cheaters. The cheaters are controlled by Areal and Areal is simulated within Aideal, see Figure 5. In the ideal model
Aideal and the honest nodes interact with an oracle that perfectly realizes the MPQC task and is incorruptible. The
oracle requires two types of inputs: first the input registers HS , A0 on which the computation of the circuit will occur,
second a flag input that indicates whether the oracle should abort or continue. If the flag input is “abort” the oracle
outputs |⊥〉〈⊥|. If the the flag input is “continue” the oracle outputs the evaluation of circuit R on the inputs HSA0.
At any moment of this simulated execution, the ideal adversary has access to all the simulated registers, in particular,
the set B of apparent cheaters. Let the input to the simulation be
ρHSAS ⊗ |0〉〈0|H0A0 , (A4)
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where ρHSAS denotes the input state of all nodes, such that tr[n]\i (ρHSAS ) = ρi.
1. Aideal locally simulates sharing and verification with simulated honest nodes using |0〉 as their input. The input
registers H0AS given to Aideal is forwarded to the simulated Areal, i.e.
σ
(1)
H0A0HSAS
= SVH0AS
(
ρHSAS ⊗ |0〉〈0|H0A0
)
, (A5)
where SVH0AS denotes the sharing and verification (see Protocol 4) performed on registers H0 and AS . We assume
that the identity operation is applied on all the registers that are not in the map SV, i.e. 1HSA0 .
2. Before Aideal proceeds with the simulation of the computation phase, for each input of the cheaters Aideal, creates
an encoding of |0〉 in register A0. Then Aideal performs a swap gate between A0 and cheaters’ input AS .
• In the case when the set |B| ≤ t, there are sufficiently few errors on both levels of encoding. Then Aideal can
apply an erasure-recovery circuit twice (for the double encoding), denoted D˜A0 , to the input of nodes not in B
and pass it to the oracle. Applying decoding D˜A0 is necessary, since the oracle accepts only single-qubit inputs.
• Otherwise, when |B| > t, Aideal simply passes previously prepared |0〉 states as inputs of the cheaters to the
oracle and the simulated honest nodes HS replace their shares with |0〉. The simulated cheaters apply an
arbitrary mapMAS to their shares.
We therefore describe this step as
σ
(2)
H0A0HSAS
=
{
D˜A0 ◦ SwapA0AS ◦ EA0(σ(1)H0A0HSAS ) if |B| ≤ t
MAS ⊗ trH0 [σ(1)H0A0HSAS ]⊗ |0〉〈0|H0 if |B| > t.
(A6)
3. Aideal proceeds with the simulation of the computation phase on registers H0 and AS . At the same time, the
oracle computes the ideal circuit RidealHSA0 on the simulated honest shares HS and register A0 of the cheaters. The state
after this step is therefore,
σ
(3)
H0A0HSAS
=
{
(RidealHSA0 ⊗ R¯H0AS )(σ
(2)
H0A0HSAS
) if |B| ≤ t
(RidealHSA0 ⊗ R¯H0AS )(σ
(2)
H0A0HSAS
) if |B| > t. (A7)
4. If |B| > t, Aideal sends the flag “abort” to the oracle, and “continue” otherwise.
• If the oracle receives “abort” it outputs a flag |⊥〉〈⊥| to all nodes.
• Otherwise, it outputs the computation of the ideal circuit on the inputs.
5. The nodes in HS output whatever they received from the oracle. Upon receiving the oracle’s output, Aideal does
the following:
• if “abort” was sent in the previous step, then it must be that |B| > t. The simulated protocol aborts. Therefore,
Aideal outputs the output of the Areal. Note that the simulated cheaters could have applied an arbitrary map
M′AS on their register.
• if “continue” sent in the previous step, then Aideal applies double encoding EA0 to all shares of the cheating nodes
A0. Then Aideal applies the swap gate between the simulated registers of cheaters AS and A0, and proceeds to
the next step.
{
SwapA0AS ◦ EA0 ◦ (RidealHSA0 ⊗ R¯H0AS )(σ
(2)
H0A0HSAS
)⊗ |cont〉〈cont| if |B| ≤ t
|⊥〉〈⊥|HSA0 ⊗ trHSA0
[
M′AS (σ
(3)
H0A0HSAS
)
]
⊗ |abort〉〈abort| if |B| > t. (A8)
Let us denote by σ(5)H0A0HSAS the following and use the explicit form of σ
(2)
H0A0HSAS
for |B| ≤ t, Equation (A7),
σ
(5)
H0A0HSAS
= SwapA0AS ◦ EA0 ◦ (RidealHSA0 ⊗ R¯H0AS ) ◦ D˜A0 ◦ SwapA0AS ◦ EA0(σ(1)H0A0HSAS ). (A9)
We will now simplify the above expression. For this we first state the following useful property.
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Property 2. For any operation OABCD on registers ABCD, the following identity holds,
SwapBC ◦ OABCD ◦ SwapBC = OACBD. (A10)
Using this property for σ(5)H0A0HSAS we get that
SwapA0AS ◦ EA0 ◦ (RidealHSA0 ⊗ R¯H0AS ) ◦ D˜A0 ◦ SwapA0AS ◦ EA0 = EAS ◦RidealHSAS ◦ D˜AS ⊗ R¯H0A0 ◦ EA0 . (A11)
This means that that the composition of the swaps with the ideal circuit performed by the oracle is equivalent to
applying the ideal circuit to registers HSAS by the oracle. Therefore, we can simplify σ
(5)
H0A0HSAS
to
σ
(5)
H0A0HSAS
= (EAS ◦RidealHSAS ◦ D˜AS )⊗ (R¯H0A0 ◦ EA0)(σ(1)H0A0HSAS )., (A12)
and using Equation (A5) we obtain,
σ
(5)
H0A0HSAS
= (EAS ◦RidealHSAS ◦ D˜AS )⊗ (R¯H0A0 ◦ EA0 ◦ SVH0AS )
(
ρHSAS ⊗ |0〉〈0|H0A0
)
(A13)
=
(
EAS ◦RidealHSAS ◦ D˜AS ◦ SVAS (ρHSAS )
)
⊗
(
R¯H0A0 ◦ EA0 ◦ SVH0
(|0〉〈0|H0A0)) . (A14)
6. If the protocol did not abort, Aideal proceeds to the reconstruction phase, in which the simulated honest nodes
H0 first use the decoding procedure for code Cˆ and then apply an erasure recovery circuit, as in the reconstruction
phase of Protocol 4. We denote this procedure by D˜H0 . On the other hand, the simulated cheaters AS apply an
arbitrary map WAS . Aideal outputs whatever is the output of the simulated Areal. Therefore, the output of the ideal
protocol is
ωideal = trH0A0
[
D˜H0 ⊗WAS (σ(5)H0A0HSAS )
]
. (A15)
Using Equation (A14) and the fact that the sharing and verification followed double decoding, D˜AS ◦ SVAS , is
equivalent to 1AS , we obtain,
ωideal =WAS ◦ EAS ◦RidealHSAS (ρHSAS ) . (A16)
Similarly, to later compare with the real protocol, we write the identity map on HS as 1AS = D˜HS ◦ EHS , and get
ωideal = (D˜HS ⊗WAS ) ◦ EHSAS ◦RidealHSAS (ρHSAS ) . (A17)
Real protocol.
In the real protocol whenever the honest nodes observe |B| > t they replace all of their shares with |0〉. This is
necessary because in the ideal protocol the oracle receives “abort” at the end of the computation phase. Therefore, in
the real protocol we also abort at the end of the computation phase. However, it could happen that in the case when
|B| > t continuing the computation leaks some information about the honest nodes’ inputs. To avoid this situation,
we make the honest nodes substitute their shares with |0〉.
1. The protocol starts with the sharing and verification phase, which we describe by the map SV acting on inputs
of all the nodes ρHRAR . The state after this step is
SVHRAR (ρHRAR) . (A18)
2. The protocol continues;
• In the case when |B| ≤ t, the nodes apply the distributed circuit R¯HRAR .
• In the case when |B| > t, the honest nodes replace their shares with |0〉 and the cheaters apply an arbitrary
mapMAR .
At the end of the computation phase the state is therefore,
σ
(2)
HRAR
=
{
R¯HRAR ◦ SVHRAR (ρHRAR) if |B| ≤ t,
MAR(trHR [SVHRAR (ρHRAR)])⊗ |0〉〈0|HR if |B| > t.
(A19)
3. The nodes check the size of set B.
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• If |B| ≤ t then the protocol continues to the reconstruction phase, where the honest nodes apply first a decoding
operator for code Cˆ and then an interpolation circuit, denoted DHR . At the same time, the cheaters can apply
an arbitrary map on their registers, which we denote WAR .
• In the case when |B| > t, the nodes output the abort flag |⊥〉〈⊥| and the cheaters output their part of σ(2)HRAR ,
possibly with an arbitrary mapM′AR . The protocol aborts.
We can describe this step as,{
(DHR ⊗WAR) ◦ R¯HRAR ◦ SVHRAR (ρHRAR)⊗ |cont〉〈cont| if |B| ≤ t,
|⊥〉〈⊥|HR ⊗M′AR(trHR [σ
(2)
HRAR
])⊗ |abort〉〈abort| if |B| > t. (A20)
We introduce the identity map as encoding followed by double encoding on both registers, i.e. 1HRAR = D˜HRAR ◦
EHRAR . Then, plugging this 1HRAR between R¯HRAR and (DHR ⊗WAR), the first case can be rewritten as,
ωreal = (DHR ⊗WAR) ◦ EHRAR ◦ D˜HRAR ◦ R¯HRAR ◦ SVHRAR (ρHRAR) , (A21)
which defines the output of the real protocol when it does not abort.
Now we aim to simplify ωreal to compare it to the output of the ideal protocol. Our goal is to show that sharing
and verifying the input, performing the distributed circuit and decoding is equivalent to applying the circuit to the
inputs directly,
D˜HRAR ◦ R¯HRAR ◦ SVHRAR (ρHRAR) = RHRAR(ρHRAR). (A22)
Indeed, this follows from Lemma 2 and Property 1. By security of the VQSS [3, 20, 21], if the protocol does not
abort, there exists a unique double-encoded state after the verification phase, i.e. SVHRAR (ρHRAR). By definition
the decoding D˜HRAR is exactly the one performed in Lemma 2. Therefore, we have that
ωreal = (DHR ⊗WAR) ◦ EHRAR ◦ D˜HRAR ◦ R¯HRAR ◦ EHRAR (ρHRAR) (A23)
= (DHR ⊗WAR) ◦ EHRAR ◦RHRAR (ρHRAR) . (A24)
This, together with Equation (A17), gives us that the outputs of the ideal and real protocol are equal for |B| ≤ t,
ωideal = ωreal. (A25)
Similarly, when |B| > t, one can compare (A7) with (A8) and obtain that the states are the same for the real and
ideal protocol. What we described so far, considers that the encoding in the sharing phase was performed correctly
in the real protocol. However, this does not have to be the case. Every verification performed during the MPQC has
a probability of error inherited from the VQSS. Recall that from Lemma 1 the probability of unsuccessful verification
in VQSS is lower-bounded by 2−Ω(s). In MPQC we verify:
• each of the n inputs,
• each |0¯〉 and |m¯〉 necessary to perform the T gate,
• each |0¯〉 necessary for the circuit R
Let κ = n+ #T gates +# ancillas for R. Then the total probability of error in MPQC is κ2−Ω(s).
